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“America is the land of the second chance – and
when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead
should lead to a better life.”
George W. Bush

President George W. Bush said this in his 2004 State of the Union speech.1 When he signed
the Second Chance Act into law in 2007, he added, “We believe that even those who have
struggled with a dark past can find brighter days ahead.” 2
This case study is about one organization, Rise Up Industries (RUI), trying to build that
path to a better life. RUI provides reentry services and support to formerly incarcerated
individuals who were previously in gangs through an intensive job training program, offered
alongside a holistic set of support services. The purpose of this case study is to provide
a deeper understanding of this approach and the results it has produced to date, while
situating it in the context of other initiatives focused on reentry and reducing recidivism. 3
This study concludes that RUI’s reentry program is a promising approach and
likely makes a small-scale contribution to solving a very hard problem – successfully
fostering the reentry of formerly gang-involved, incarcerated individuals into society.

2

Rise Up Industries Programming

R

RISE UP / KROC IPJ

ise Up Industries emerged from the work of Kairos Prison Ministry in the
early 2010s. 4 During an event organized by Kairos at the Donovan Correctional
Facility in San Diego, Father Greg Boyle of Homeboy Industries 5 in Los Angeles
challenged Joseph Gilbreath, a Kairos volunteer, to establish something
similar in San Diego. In response, Gilbreath, Ross Provenzano, and other Kairos
volunteers founded RUI in 2013. The mission statement of RUI reads: Rise Up Industries
minimizes gang involvement by providing integrated gang prevention, gang intervention, and
post-detention reentry services. RUI describes their longer-term goal for this three-pronged
approach as breaking the “intergenerational cycle of gang violence.” 6
RUI began by launching their 18-month reentry program in 2016, after just over three years
of research on the needs in San Diego and the organizations already working on reentry
services in San Diego County.7 According to RUI leadership, they launched the reentry
program first in part because alumni of the reentry program could then participate in their
gang prevention and intervention efforts.
RUI is currently laying the foundation for more robust gang prevention programming through
a series of speaking engagements, in which reentry program participants and alumni
speak with at-risk and justice-involved youth with the goal of assisting them in making
more positive life choices. As part of these efforts, RUI is also developing an MOU with
Monarch School. 8 Monarch School is a school in San Diego that educates children impacted
by homelessness. Participants in the program will continue to regularly visit the school
to speak with the students. RUI’s future plans for its gang prevention and intervention
initiatives will be discussed in more detail below.

The Reentry Program
RUI’s reentry work includes two basic components: 18 months of intensive job training
focused on training participants to be machine tool operators and a basket of additional
reentry support services provided to the participants in the job training program.

Participants: The reentry program focuses on formerly incarcerated individuals that grew

up in street gangs. The time program participants spent in prison varies widely, from several
years to several decades. RUI does not recruit. Their participants come to them through
word of mouth and normally contact staff through a letter or phone call from prison or
soon after being released. To select participants, RUI conducts a series of interviews and a
psychosocial assessment of potential candidates. According to RUI staff, the primary criteria
for selection is an earnest desire to change and a demonstrated willingness to commit to
the 18-month program.
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Job training: RUI trains participants to be CNC machine operators. 9 The curriculum

includes classroom training, hands-on training using CNC machines, and on-the-job
training in the RUI machine shop. RUI can train 12 participants at a time. When at this
capacity, two participants graduate each quarter, two can enroll each quarter, and a total
of eight participants can graduate each year. This rotation creates an organic mentorship/
apprenticeship element to the program as well. According to RUI documents, the full
program involves 340 classroom hours, 606 hours of hands-on training, and 1,727 hours of
on-the-job training working on the machine shop floor.
Originally, RUI planned to organize their training program around selling coffee and providing
silk screening services. As a result of conversations with a formerly incarcerated individual
who had been involved with Kairos, and who had been trained in CNC machining in Donovan
Correctional Facility, they decided to focus on training machine tool operators. This skill
has several benefits for individuals going through the reentry process. The skills required
are learnable in 18 months, CNC machine operators are in high demand, and positions pay
a relatively good wage – average annual salary is roughly $40,000.10 RUI graduates’ salaries
have often been above this average, with recent graduates making from $50,000 to $68,000
within two years of starting their job.11
Finally, operating a CNC machine is not physically demanding and can be done into one’s
60s and 70s. This contrasts with many types of positions offered to those leaving prison,
such as construction or working in San Diego’s shipyards. These jobs can be difficult
physically for those who have spent decades incarcerated. Moreover, few leaving prison have
savings or have been contributing to social security or other retirement plans, meaning they
will need to continue to work to an older age.

Machine shop social enterprise: RUI’s participants are trained in their machine shop,

which operates as a social enterprise. RUI opened its first machine shop in 2016 with one
CNC machine. It now runs a 3,400-square-foot facility with six CNC machines. The machine
shop has had over 60 customers since its opening. RUI leadership said that given the
current size of the facility, they don’t have the capacity to take on more work from current
or new customers. An RUI board member noted that customers choose RUI in part because
of its mission.12 Thus, if RUI can produce products of equal quality and at the same price as
for-profit companies, it has some comparative advantage in the marketplace.
The machine shop currently provides roughly 30 percent of RUI’s gross revenue. According
to RUI’s business plan, their current expansion plans, discussed below, will allow them to
reach an initial goal of the machine shop providing 50 percent of RUI’s gross revenue in five
years. Ross Provenzano, a current RUI board member who has been involved with RUI since

4

RISE UP / KROC IPJ

the beginning, said, “If we are able to get to 50 percent, it would be huge.” He went on to
note that fundraising, particularly to support formerly incarcerated individuals, is always
going to be difficult and that it is getting more difficult all the time.13 The leadership also
described a very long-term vision, based on peer organizations they have interacted with,
of the machine shop providing 100 percent of their revenue.
RUI staff see the social enterprise as central to their vision but are also aware of the
inevitable tension between the business side of RUI and the mission-driven side of RUI.
They are eager to reduce as much as possible their reliance on donors and grants but
also note, for instance, that a normal business would not train individuals for 18 months
and then immediately provide them to their competition. Jonathan Yackley, the Deputy
Executive Director of RUI, emphasized that anyone who has managed a social enterprise
knows this tension is real: “Earning more money allows you to serve more people, but, on
the other hand, you have to be careful not to let production work (which generates income)
get in the way of training (which does not).” 14

Reentry support services: Since they opened, RUI has provided other reentry support

services alongside the job training program. According to RUI, each participant receives at
least five counseling sessions, has regular interactions with a case manager, is appointed a
mentor, and completes three months of budgeting and financial literacy training. As needed,
participants may also engage in weekly counseling sessions throughout the 18 months, have
tattoos removed, attend 12-step recovery groups, and continue budgeting and financial
literacy training. Other types of support include assistance finding affordable housing,
arranging medical insurance or medical treatment, and navigating social services
or government agencies (e.g., to get a birth certificate or driver’s license).
RUI recently hired a full-time case manager to coordinate these services, based on each
participant’s need, through the development of an “Individualized Service Plan.” Previously,
RUI had a part-time case manager. RUI provides reentry support services directly or through
partnerships with other organizations. For example, the San Diego District Attorney’s
office provides support for tattoo removal while Family Health Centers helps with medical
insurance and treatment. An analysis produced by RUI as part of their five-year vision
estimates that participants in RUI’s program spent 447 total hours receiving support
services as compared to 2,673 hours in formal training and on-the-job training on the
machine shop floor – roughly 14 percent of participants’ time spent with the organization.
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In addition to the specific services offered, RUI’s approach to providing social services
is worth emphasizing. First, RUI staff are emphatic that each of their participants is an
individual. Beyond the core set of services that each RUI participant receives, participants
only receive the services they and the case manager decide they need, when they
need it. To implement this “as needed” approach, RUI integrates flexibility into all their
programming. Those participating in job training, for instance, can leave RUI’s facility to
access services or to go to appointments as needed.
Second, alongside the more formal services offered, RUI clearly seeks to foster a culture
of mutual support. More than one staff member used the work “kinship” in describing how
RUI supports its program participants and how they support each other. Staff members
noted that participants call each other brother and highlighted activities like the Friday book
clubs, where participants can connect with each other in ways that are not possible during
training or on the shop floor.

Plans for the Future
RUI leadership is undertaking two major new initiatives. The first expands the reentry
program. The second formalizes the gang prevention program through the establishment of
a community center focused on gang prevention.

Expanding the reentry program: RUI has currently launched a five-year plan to double
the capacity of their reentry program to 24 participants. This will require obtaining a
new 20,000-square-foot facility. Upon obtaining a new facility, RUI plans to reach their
new maximum capacity of 24 participants by 2025, which will allow them to graduate
16 participants per year. RUI hopes to obtain the new facility in a more gang-impacted
community than Santee, where their facility is currently.15

Community-based gang prevention programming: In addition to the expansion of its

reentry program, RUI plans to expand its efforts to prevent youth involvement in gangs.
To date, these efforts have primarily been one-off events or small-scale efforts in which
RUI participants or alumni share their experiences with youth, community members,
policymakers, or other stakeholders. The MOU with Monarch School, described above, is one
effort to move beyond one-off events to more sustained engagement with an organization
serving youth.
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RUI leadership described plans to establish a community center for youth in a ganginvolved neighborhood. Currently, RUI is working with researchers to develop a more
detailed plan for this initiative. In interviews, two RUI board members acknowledged that
this initiative would be challenging, noting that it is an almost entirely different program
model than current reentry work, that many other organizations work in the youth space,
and that youth prevention programs would require a different funding model than the
reentry program, which generates income through the social enterprise.
RUI is not currently implementing initiatives under the gang intervention prong of their
approach, defined as helping youth and young adults who are already in gangs to leave
them. RUI leadership noted that work under this prong would evolve out of the gang
prevention and reentry work.

Rise Up Programming Model – Key Takeaways
The following section will discuss RUI’s results to date, but first it is important to
highlight some key takeaways from RUI’s reentry programming model.

The commitment: Current and former participants stressed that RUI’s program – a

full-time, 18-month program – required serious commitment. One participant noted that
when he was thinking about joining RUI, he realized he had never been out of prison for
18 months in a row.16
Related to this, current participants noted that the most challenging part of the program
was that it requires living on minimum wage in a very expensive city. RUI pays minimum
wage at first, then $1.00 over minimum wage after six months and $2.25 over minimum
wage after 12 months. One participant said he needs to work a second job after he
finishes the day at RUI in order to have enough money on which to live. The same
participant suggested that RUI provide dedicated transitional housing as a way to help
participants complete RUI’s program.17

The culture of care: The extent to which RUI staff genuinely care about the participants
in the program is immediately evident. One alumni of the program said he had such trust
issues coming out of prison that it took him months to trust that the staff did just want
to help him, that there was not some ulterior motive. This care is most evident in the
commitment of RUI staff to getting participants the support they need. In an interview,
Joseph Gilbreath immediately emphasized the individuality of all participants, that there
is no cookie-cutter approach.18 This care is also evident in the use of words like “kinship”
and “family” to describe the team at RUI, including the participants in the program. One
alumnus of the program noted how an RUI staff member loaned him his car so he could
get to work when not even his family would do so.19
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It is clear that such care is needed. Many individuals coming out of prison are emotionally
traumatized and/or often physically unhealthy. Even those who are not can be overwhelmed
by the challenges of rebuilding their lives and often lack the skills or knowledge to do basic
things such as use a cellphone or get an email account. One participant noted that he had
problems at a previous job because he did not know how to punch in using a modern time
clock. 20 For all these reasons, it is important that RUI provides holistic support not only
to help manage the myriad practical issues reentering individuals face but also to provide
emotional support and a safe space to manage deeper emotional issues.
Such holistic support, however, raises several issues, the most important of which is what
happens at the end of the program. RUI staff acknowledged that even though participants in
the program are fully trained in the relevant professional skills, they do not enjoy the same
flexibility or support after the transition to a normal job. RUI is working on strategies to help
participants better manage that transition. Similarly, an alumnus of the program noted that
there is a tension to be managed between the desire to treat RUI participants as “family
members” and the fact that they are still employees. He said participants still need to see
RUI as an employer, “If not, everyone takes things really personally.”21

The social enterprise: RUI’s approach includes a business that produces products

competitive in quality and price to for-profit companies and has as many customers as it
can serve at its current capacity. This is a significant achievement. Most social enterprises
fail. According to one study by the World Economic Forum focused on Mexico, only 2.6
percent lasted seven to nine years. 22 Within the United States, it is estimated that social
enterprises fail at the same rate as normal small businesses – meaning half don’t last
longer than five years. 23 In contrast, given their customer base, there is every reason to
believe that RUI’s business is sustainable and can continue to provide revenue to help RUI
meet its mission.
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Recidivism
As of July 22, 2022, RUI has enrolled 41 participants. Fourteen participants have graduated.
All graduates of the program received full-time employment as machine operators upon
graduation. One graduate has been reconvicted – for a recidivism rate of seven percent
among graduates.
Eighteen individuals enrolled but left the program for a variety of reasons. Some of these
individuals left because they had good opportunities and have been successful since leaving
the program, while others have continued to struggle. 24
Seven percent recidivism compares very favorably to estimates of recidivism generally. A
2021 report, for instance, estimated 44.6 percent of offenders in California were reconvicted
within three years of release. 25 Others have noted that the recidivism rate in California has
hovered around 50 percent for years. 26 These percentages are based on the Bureau of State
and Community Corrections’ definition of recidivism for adults: reconviction within three
years of release from prison. 27
There are two important caveats, however, in drawing conclusions about the seven percent
recidivism rate of RUI. First, the sample size is small, only 14 graduates. Second, it is difficult
to know what would have happened to the participants if they had not entered the program.
RUI screens for participants with a demonstrated “desire to change,” so it is possible that
the participants would have been fine in the absence of the program, with a lower-thanaverage recidivism rate. The reverse is also possible, that in the absence of RUI’s program,
the participants would have had a higher-than-average recidivism rate. This is plausible given
that RUI only serves former gang members, who often served long prison sentences.
Future research on RUI should seek to track some kind a “comparison group” with individuals
similar to participants in the program but who do not enter the program. This could be
a group, for instance, that is accepted for the program but that RUI does not have the
space to include. Pre-post interviews could be done with this comparison group in order
to understand how they fared without participating in RUI’s program. This type of research
would allow stronger conclusions to be drawn about the effectiveness of the program. 28
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Cost and Cost-Effectiveness
Given RUI’s intensive, 18-month model, which creates a relatively high cost per graduate, it
is useful to discuss the cost and cost-effectiveness of its programming.

Cost: According to 2021 financial statements provided by RUI, the organization’s total

expenses in 2021 were $1,034,698. Given that RUI graduates eight individuals per year,
the cost per graduate is $129,337. However, the participants in the program also generate
revenue. The social enterprise’s net revenue in 2021 was $144,677, or $18,084 per graduate.
When this revenue is taken into account, the total net cost is $890,021 and the net cost per
graduate is $111,252.63.

Cost-effectiveness: The most direct way of looking at the cost-effectiveness of RUI’s

program is to calculate the costs saved by reducing recidivism. According to the report
cited above, the recidivism rate for California is 44.6 percent. 29 It costs roughly $106,000 to
incarcerate an individual for one year. 30 The table below runs cost-effectiveness scenarios
for RUI’s current cost structure and for their projected cost structure after their five-year
expansion plan.
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Current and Projected Scenarios
2021 Scenario
GRADUATES PER YEAR

8

NET COST PER GRADUATE

$111,253.63

TOTAL NET COST

$890,021 ($111,252.63 X 8)

EXPECTED RECIDIVISM RATE

3.57 individuals (BASED ON CALIFORNIA RECIDIVISM RATE OF 44.6%)

RUI RECIDIVISM RATE

0.56 individuals (BASED ON RUI’S RECIDIVISM RATE OF 7%)

CHANGE IN RECIDIVISM

3.01 individuals

Assuming an average prison sentence of five years
and an annual cost of incarceration of $106,000, then:

COST OF INCARCERATING 3.01 INDIVIDUALS

$1,595,300

COST SAVINGS FOR ONE YEAR OF PROGRAMMING

$705,279

(3.01 X 5 X $106,000)

($1,595,300 - $890,021)

(ACCRUED OVER FIVE YEARS)

Projected Scenario for 202531
GRADUATES PER YEAR

16

NET COST PER GRADUATE

$52,189

TOTAL NET COST

$835,016 ($52,189 X 16)

EXPECTED RECIDIVISM RATE

7.11 individuals (BASED ON CALIFORNIA RECIDIVISM RATE OF 44.6%)

RUI RECIDIVISM RATE

1.12 individuals (BASED ON RUI’S RECIDIVISM RATE OF 7%)

CHANGE IN RECIDIVISM

5.99 individuals

Assuming an average prison sentence of five years
and an annual cost of incarceration of $106,000, then:
COST OF INCARCERATING 5.99 INDIVIDUALS

$3,174,700

COST SAVINGS FOR ONE YEAR OF PROGRAMMING

$2,339,684

(5.99 X 5 X $106,000)
($3,174,700 - $835,016)

(ACCRUED OVER FIVE YEARS)
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One could run various scenarios with these numbers by shifting assumptions around
regarding the success of the program, the recidivism rate used, or the average length of a
prison sentence. However, in general, because of the very high cost of incarceration, if it is
assumed that RUI’s program creates a reduction in recidivism, then it will almost always be
a cost-effective solution.
In addition to savings from reducing recidivism, one might also consider revenue generated
by placing program participants in well-paid jobs. Individuals leaving prison normally get
minimum-wage jobs, or no jobs at all. Each individual graduating from RUI’s program has
been placed in a well-paid job that is part of a longer-term career track. Each year they are
in that job, they both generate tax revenue and make fewer demands on social services.
Lastly, there are the non-quantifiable benefits of reducing recidivism. Although it is not
possible to place a dollar value, for instance, on a father being able to spend extra years
with his children, these years have immense value to the father, to the children, and to the
broader society.
Finally, it is important to note that this analysis shows that RUI is a cost-effective solution
but not whether it is the most cost-effective solution. Making this conclusion would require
a comparative cost-effectiveness analysis comparing RUI with other reentry programs. Such
research is beyond the scope of this case study but should be considered for the future.
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The previous section summarized the results of RUI’s programming based on the data
that is currently available. This section will place the RUI program model in the context
of the broader research on reentry programming. The goal is to better understand if we
should expect RUI to be successful based on the findings of this research regarding what is
effective and ineffective in regard to reentry programming more generally.
Researchers on reentry have developed a number of different lists and typologies of
what is needed to foster successful reentry. While these lists vary somewhat, they
normally include housing, employment, life management skills, support for physical and
mental health, support to address substance abuse, emotional-behavioral support, and
peer support and healthy relationships. 32 Sometimes one or more of these is left out,
sometimes the prioritization differs, but in general there is consensus that reentering
individuals require support to address a spectrum of needs, from the basic to the more
intangible and complex.
While there is some consensus on what is needed for successful reentry, the clear
takeaway from the current research is that designing consistently successful reentry
programs is extremely difficult. The Handbook of Issues in Criminal Justice Reform in the
United States, for instance, summarizes the findings on reentry programs as “lackluster,”
noting that evaluations of these programs “typically yield mixed results.”33 A 2018 review
of research by the National Institute of Justice concludes simply, “We don’t have a strong
understanding of what works and what doesn’t…” 34
In line with this conclusion, there are numerous examples of research, looking at a wide
variety of reentry initiatives, that have found no effects or, in some cases, negative effects.
These include the following:
— Maria Berghuis’ review of nine rigorously evaluated reentry programs concludes, “The
results suggest that current reentry programs have no significant effects on reducing or
increasing odds of recidivism for adult, male offenders.” 35
— In a systematic review of the evidence, Jennifer Doleac finds some evidence of positive
impact for only one program: cognitive-behavioral 36 therapy. She finds little evidence
of positive impact and even evidence of negative impact for several types of programs,
including housing support, transitional jobs, therapeutic communities, HOPE-style
substance abuse programs, 37 and wraparound services. 38
— An evaluation of seven programs funded by the Second Chance Act found a small
but statistically significant increase in rearrests and reconvictions in the group that
received services compared to the control group. 39 An evaluation of seven job training
programs funded under the Enhanced Transitional Job Demonstration initiative found
no “statistically significant impact on the amount of child support paid or on a broad
measure of recidivism.” 40
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Some studies do show positive results, but they feature small or mixed impacts – showing
positive results on certain measures but not others, or impacts only for certain subgroups.
These include the following:
— In a systematic review of evidence on juvenile aftercare programs designed to reduce
recidivism, Weaver and Campbell overall found no significant impact but concluded that
these programs can be effective for older youth with more violent criminal histories. 41
— An evaluation of the Male Community Reentry Program – a program that moves
inmates out of prison to a community-based program location prior to the completion
of their sentences – shows somewhat more promising results. For participants in the
program for at least nine months, the program reduced the likelihood of rearrest by 13
percentage points and reconviction by 11 percentage points. 42 The authors did indicate
these findings should be seen as preliminary, given the small number of individuals
placed in the comparison group during the research.
Closer to home, research conducted by San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG)
has found similar mixed results:
— The final evaluation report of the San Diego Prisoner Reentry Program, implemented
in San Diego County between 2007 and 2012, found that participants in their first year
after release were less likely than the comparison group to be rearrested or returned
to prison, but that the program had no impact on reconviction or on receiving a prison
sentence for a new offense. 43
— An evaluation of the Successful Treatment and Reentry (STAR) Program released in 2021
found that, after 24 months, those who went through the program had significantly
higher rates of arrest and conviction than those in the control group. 44
This brief review of research on reentry shows the challenge that the current carceral
system within the United States poses for reentry programming, both in the number of
individuals being imprisoned and the length of the sentences they are serving. Within
this research, there are no program models that have been shown to successfully and
consistently address these challenges. At the very least, it appears that programs need to
be customized to meet the needs of specific subgroups of the reentering population. This
population is not homogenous, and therefore we should not expect a single type program to
work for everyone coming out of prison.
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It is also important to be realistic about the extent to which programs can address the
reentry challenge without broader changes. Some researchers, in fact, have concluded
that reentry programming will never be able to address the full scale of this challenge
without broader societal changes. Mears and Cochran, for instance, conclude that,
“In short, successful reentry depends on improving our criminal justice correctional
system, and more broadly policy making.” 45
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Are there findings from the reentry research that can help us understand whether we
should expect RUI’s programming to be effective? As noted above, overall, the research on
reentry initiatives is somewhat pessimistic. However, there are some unique characteristics
of RUI’s model that provide reasons to believe their programming will be more effective
than many of the programs assessed in the research.

Job Training
Job training is at the core of RUI’s approach. Multiple researchers have found that job
training of various kinds has not been effective. 46 However, many of these programs focus
on either providing support for job placement or providing low-level transitional jobs.
Leadership at RUI intentionally designed their program as a longer-term, more intensive
training program that prepares participants for a career instead of a transitional job.
Joseph Gilbreath noted that when RUI started, “We were thinking what they needed was
employment,” but over time RUI learned that “they needed a career with a livable wage.” 47
Jonathan Yackley described RUI’s approach as comprehensive and compared it specifically
to approaches that just provide job training or a career center that just helps individuals
find a job. He noted as well that from the beginning RUI believed that short-term job
training would not be effective. 48 This realization comes in part from their connection
with Homeboy Industries, which is known for its “as long as it takes” approach to working
with individuals. 49
It is also likely important that RUI offers a range of support services in addition to job
training. Newton et al. conclude that, “When offered in isolation from other services,
there is reason to suspect that employment readiness programs will be ineffective.”50 RUI
participants noted that doing all the little things necessary to manage life outside of prison
was often what had the potential to cause the most problems. 51

Wraparound Services
While RUI’s range of support services may contribute to the success of its job training
efforts, the support raises a different issue. In a review of the research to date, Doleac
found that “the existing evidence suggests that wrap-around service programs, as currently
implemented, are not effective and may be actively detrimental to participants.”52
She argues that this could be the case because programs demand too much time and
energy of participants, time and energy that perhaps could be spent more productively
doing other things.
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There are some reasons to believe that RUI programs can overcome this challenge. RUI’s
model integrates support into the eight-hour work day, during which the participants are
paid a full-time wage. Most wraparound-service programs pay at most a small subsidy to
the participants. At RUI, either support for participants is provided onsite during the work
day or participants can leave during the work day to, for instance, do tattoo removal or get
a driver’s license. Moreover, RUI is committed to a flexible, as needed approach to providing
support services, thereby reducing the overall demand on participants’ time. The hiring
of a full-time, onsite case manager will likely improve their ability to implement this
flexible approach.
Doleac also hypothesizes that wraparound services might fail because they damage an
individual’s sense of agency, conveying the message that individuals cannot succeed without
help. She argues, “less intensive interventions may be more successful precisely because
they allow people the psychological freedom to build new lives, and opportunities to
achieve success with direct assistance.”
This issue is relevant for RUI’s programs. In interviews, the RUI team discussed the
challenge of participants transitioning to a normal workplace that does not offer the same
level of support. Similarly, an RUI alumnus discussed the tension between seeing RUI as
a family and seeing RUI as an employer. This is a complex, nuanced issue, and the right
degree of support to provide, while not undermining an individual’s agency, will be different
for each participant. The ability of RUI to be flexible, and the deep knowledge they have
of every participant, likely supports their ability to manage this tension. At the same time,
perhaps counterintuitively, their deep commitment to kinship and a culture of care may
make it difficult at times to support the independence and agency of their participants.
Jonathan Yackley indicated that they are aware of this challenge and noted that they use
techniques such as “coach-navigator interventions” and “motivational interviewing” to
provide support while increasing, as opposed to undermining, agency and efficacy. 53

Duration of the Program
Within the reentry research, we found no studies that assessed programs as long as
RUI’s – 18 months. Somewhat surprisingly, researchers often fail to report the duration of
reentry programs under assessment, but no programs in the research reviewed reported
a duration of 18 months or more. Therefore, the impact that the duration of RUI’s program
has on effectiveness is largely an open question. One of the few bright spots in the
literature, the MCRP program, also had a relatively long duration and was more effective if
participants were in the program for nine months versus six months. 54 On the other hand,
longer programs will increase the tension between providing support and fostering agency
described above. Given how central the 18-month commitment is to RUI’s model, it will be
important to monitor future research to see if additional insights can be gleaned regarding
the relationship between duration and effectiveness.
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The previous sections assessed the current data on RUI’s effectiveness and costeffectiveness and examined what the broader research on reentry programming can tell
us about whether we should expect RUI’s programs to be effective. However, even assuming
effectiveness, there is a second key issue, that of scale. Roughly 40,000 individuals
are released from prison in California each year, 55 roughly 600,000 are released from
prison nationwide. 56 In the U.S., 93 percent of individuals in prison will return to their
communities. 57
Even after their planned expansion, RUI will serve 24 participants and graduate 16
individuals per year. This expansion will take five years. Thus, in the short- to mediumterm, RUI will not be able to significantly scale its programs. This is not surprising given the
organization’s long-term, intensive job training program, its commitment to treating each
participant as an individual, its goal of fostering kinship, and so on.
While it is sobering to look at the number of graduates RUI produces in comparison to
the total number of individuals released each year, it is not necessarily fair to expect that
RUI should concern itself with the overall scale of the reentry problem. RUI leadership
admit that their size is a challenge when talking about their organization, particularly in
interactions with funders or government officials. They also make clear that their primary
focus is on creating impact for the individuals with whom they are able to work. Joseph
Gilbreath noted that, from his time working with Kairos Prison Ministries, his focus has been
working with participants one-on-one as individuals. He noted that he’s “not interested
in numbers” if that means losing focus on the individual or sacrificing the efficacy of the
program. 58 Jonathan Yackley also said, “We are going to do a great job with the people that
have entrusted their time to us and treat them well.”59
This sentiment may not satisfy government officials and policymakers concerned with
creating solutions on the scale of the problems their communities face. The reality,
however, is that, according to the research on reentry, there are not ready-made, scalable
solutions to the problem of reentry. Focused solutions serving a small number individuals
may currently be the best option available.
There is a final path to scale, which would involve scaling the model of RUI through the
establishment of similar organizations, as opposed to growing RUI itself. In many ways, this
“franchise model” is the approach of the Global Homeboy Network of which RUI is a part.
The Network consists of organizations in 33 states and 19 countries committed to Homeboy
Industries’ goal of providing “marginalized men, women, and youth with tools they need to
change their lives and become productive members of their communities.”60 The challenge
with this approach is having enough organizations in the network to create impact at scale.
One RUI participant noted that RUI, with its longer-term, intensive job training approach,
is unique in San Diego. He meant this as a compliment to RUI, but it also speaks to the
challenge of addressing the reentry problem through a franchise model even at the smaller
scale of a county like San Diego. Nonetheless, future research should explore the extent to
which the Global Homeboy Network is successfully creating impact at scale, or not.
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When asked about the question of scale, Joseph Gilbreath
shared this about the larger vision of Rise Up Industries:

RUI is not solely focused on reentry services. Our
mission is to minimize street gang activity in San
Diego. Gangs are responsible for the majority of
violent crime in most communities. Gang activity
involves an intergenerational life cycle as youth
follow the paths of their parents, uncles, and
cousins. A large percentage of the incarcerated
population has also been involved in gangs. If the
root causes are not addressed, the cycle continues,
thus increasing gang violence, other crime, and
incarceration. RUI intends to address this issue
through a three-prong approach – gang prevention,
gang intervention, and reentry.
RUI started with the third prong – reentry. The
intent is to have reentry program members and
graduates help structure the future prevention
and intervention programs. RUI members and
graduates have served as credible messengers in
speaking engagements with at-risk youth. This is
a valuable service to these youth who are faced
with difficult life decisions at a very young age. It is
also a healing experience for the members as they
address the impacts of the poor choices they made
earlier in life. As the prevention and intervention
programs start up and the alumni base from all
three programs continues to grow, there will be a
significant increase in community involvement and
outreach and a clear demonstration that there are
better alternatives to gang life. This will not happen
overnight, but a systematic, structured approach
with continual refinement based on lessons learned
is needed if this cycle is to be broken.
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To again summarize the core conclusion of this case study: Based on their results to
date, RUI’s reentry program is a promising program that potentially makes a small-scale
contribution to solving what the research tells us is a very hard problem – reintegrating
formerly incarcerated individuals into society. Despite the relatively high cost per
participant of RUI’s model, it also represents a cost-effective solution given the high cost
of incarceration. Finally, because it has developed a successful social enterprise and has a
viable plan for that enterprise to fund roughly 50 percent of its operations in the next five
years, RUI has a significantly higher chance of being sustainable than most nonprofits. This
provides the opportunity to create sustained impact over time.

Future Research
While this case study answered many questions about RUI and its model, it also raised
several questions that future research should seek to answer. First, more research on the
effectiveness of RUI’s model is needed. In particular, research that establishes some kind of
comparison group of individuals who are similar to RUI’s participants but do not go through
RUI’s program is necessary to make stronger claims about the effectiveness of RUI’s model.
Second, more research should be conducted on the duration of RUI’s model and its
relationship to effectiveness. At the core of RUI’s model is the 18-month commitment
participants make. This time commitment is hard on participants and also contributes
significantly to the high cost per participant of RUI’s model. Thus, it would be beneficial
to research whether similar results can be achieved in one year or even nine months,
for instance.
Third, more research should be conducted on Homeboy Industries and the “franchise
model” of the Global Homeboy Network. Is this network model a more effective
way to achieve greater scale than expecting individual organizations to scale their
impact themselves?
Finally, more research is needed comparing RUI to other reentry program models. As noted
above, assuming research continues to show RUI’s program model is effective, it is likely a
cost-effective solution to the reentry problem. But that does not mean it is the most costeffective solution. The only way this can be assessed is through comparative research that
looks at the cost and the results of several reentry program models.
Conducting these strands of research in the future not only will tell us more about RUI but
also will help inform broader reentry policy and programming in the San Diego region. Given
the scale of the challenge, and the diversity of the reentering population, a broad ecosystem
of policies, programs, and other initiatives is necessary to address it. Future research can
help inform the development of that ecosystem to ensure that initiatives like RUI can
successfully play their part and that synergies are built across the ecosystem so that the
overall impact is more than the sum of its parts.
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Individuals involved with Rise Up Industries interviewed for this case study:
— Joseph Gilbreath, Executive Director
— Jonathan Yackley, Deputy Executive Director
— Dustin Greeves, Machine Shop Manager
— Two current reentry program participants
— One reentry program alumnus
— Stephen Boyle, Board Member
— Ross Provenzano, Board Member (and one of RUI’s founders)
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